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HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 
HYPOTHESIS IN BRITISH METHODOLOGICAL THOUGHT: 
NEWTON TO WHEWELL 
GARY BLUM 
Department of Religion and Philosophy 
University of Nebraska at Omaha 68132 
In this paper I wish to trace the gradual breaking away from the powerful 
influence of Isaac Newton's views on the admissibility of hypotheses in 
"experimental philosophy," mainly as this break occurred in the writing of 
19th century methodologists in Great Britain. 
First, let us consider Newton's notion of hypothesis. The term is used in 
many different ways in Newton's various writings (I. B. Cohen, in Franklin & 
Newton, has distinguished at least 9 different senses of the word). But two 
major considerations are relatively clear: Newton called his science "experi-
mental philosophy" in order to contrast it with the "hypothetical philoso-
phy" of the Cartesians, and, secondly, hypotheses are contrasted by Newton 
with phenomena or things derived from phenomena. Newton's famous 
remark "Hypotheses non Jingo" oc;;urs in this passage from the General 
Scholium of the Principia: "Hitherto .1 have not been able to discover the 
cause of those properties of gravity from phenomena and I frame no 
hypotheses. For whatever is not deduced from the phenomena is to be called 
a hypothesis; and thpotheses, whether metaphysical or physical, whether of 
occult qualities or mechanical, have no place in experimental philosophy." 
(Thayer, 1953 :45). But this quotation is not entirely typical of Newton. In 
the first edition of the Principia he labeled at least 9 propositions as 
Hypotheses (these included what in later editions were called the Rules of 
Reasoning and the Phenomena), and he is quoted elsewhere as saying that in 
his own philosophy" ... hypotheses have no place, unless as conjectures or 
questions proposed to be examined by experiments." (Cohen, 1962:388). 
Thus it seems that we can mark out three important senses of 
hypothesis: 
1) One meaning is that of an axiom or postulate in the system (either 
methodological or physical). Examples: In Book 3 of the Principia 
(3rd edition) (Hyp. 1.) "The centre of the system of the world is 
immovable"; Book 3 of Principia (I st edition) (Hyp. 1) "We are to 
admit no more causes of natural things, than such as are both true 
and sufficient to explain their appearances." (Koyre, 1968:29-30). 
These propositions are plausible assumptions to be accepted, 
without further proof. 
2) A second meaning is related to "conjectures or questions proposed 
to be examined by experiments." Evidently these propositions are 
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empirically testable. Some of Newton's Queries in the Opticks were 
intended to fall into this class. Although testable they have not yet 
been tested. 
3) A third sense of the term includes those hypotheses which lack the 
kind of empirical testability of those hypotheses captured by the 
second use of the term. In a letter to Cotes, Newton defines this 
third class as follows: "The word hypothesis is here used by me to 
signify only such a proposition as is not a phenomena or deduced 
from any phenomena but assumed or supposed without any 
experimental proof." (Koyre, 1968:38). From remarks and exam-
ples given by Newton, he seems to want to include in this category 
not only those propositions assumed without experimental proof, 
i.e., those constructed on a non-phenomenal basis; but also those 
which can be falsified by the evidence. The basic fault in both of 
these cases is that the hypotheses were not deduced from pheno-
mena. 
Descartes, who seemes to be the target of many of Newton's methodo-
logical restrictions, fails on both of the counts mentioned in (3) in the case of 
his theory of vortices. First of all, the leading principles of that theory were 
not suggested by phenomena, but by Descartes' metaphysical views, and thus 
they were, to Newton, initially impluasible; secondly, that theory's implica-
tions seemed to contradict empirical fact. 
Another important subclass of hypotheses not derived from phenomena 
is marked out in this revealing passage from a draft of the 3rd Book of the 
Principia: 
"The argument of induction taken from experiments and the observations of the 
senses on which experimental philosophy is founded cannot apply to hypothetical 
or metaphysical entities which are not phenomena except through hypotheses: 
therefore, nothing which is determined about bodies by means of induction in this 
book refers to those entities. Here it is a question only of sensible things and their 
parts because the argument of induction concerns these alone." (Newton, MS). 
This passage clearly indicates that inductive reasoning cannot extend to 
anything beyond the phenomenal. Thus, those hypotheses that refer to 
non-phenomenal entities are considered to be not deduced from phenomena, 
and inductive conclusions cannot apply to these entities. 
It seems, then, that when Newton excludes from experimental philoso-
phy those hypotheses not derived or deduced from phenomena, he is 
excluding at least three types of hypotheses: (1) those derived from first 
principles which are metaphysical or non-physical; (2) those whose implica-
tions are falsified by empirical facts; (3) those referring to non-phenomenal 
entities, and to which entities inductive conclusions cannot be applied. 
Note that proscribing the first type of hypotheses amounts to a 
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restriction on the source or origin of an hypothesis, and seems to be a kind of 
confusion of the context of justification and context of discovery. The 
second type of proscribed hypothesis may pose less of a problem to the 
concerned methodologist (unless he takes Feyerabend seriously). But the 
third type of excluded hypothesis amounts to a quite severe restriction on the 
nature of scientific theories. In effect, it rules out any theory that makes 
reference to non-phenomenal entities. Obviously Newton violates his Own 
strictures in admitting the existence of the void, of atoms, of aethereal spirit, 
and of non-mechanical forces. But the expression "hypothesis," notes Koyre, 
is like one of those curious terms like "heresy," that we never apply to 
ourselves, but only to others. And the others, for Newton, are the Cartesians, 
Leibniz, and Hooke, to name a few. 
Although Newton's phrase "Hypotheses non fingo" was a slogan for 
many intellectual reformers in and out of science, it seems that the first 
philosopher in Great Britain to seriously cultivate Newton's anti-hypothetical 
views was Thomas Reid (17lO-96). Reid was trained in the natural sciences 
and lectured in physics and mathematics and philosophy at Aberdeen and 
Glasgow. He lectured on the Principia for twelve years, and later, in his two 
books, An Inquiry into the Human Mind (1765) and Essays on the 
Intellectual Powers of Man (1785), he tried to develop a scientific philosophy 
of mind, or psychology, based on his insights into Newton's scientific 
method. 
He garnered from Newton a near contempt for hypotheses, theories, or 
conjectures which were not induced from experiments and observations. This 
revealing quote from his Essay on the Intellectual Powers of Man sums up his 
attitude: 
" ... discoveries have always been made by patient observation, by accurate experi-
ments, or by conclusions drawn by strict reasoning from observations and experiments, 
and such discoveries have always tended to refute, but not to confirm, the theories and 
hypotheses which ingenious men have invented. 
As this is a fact confirmed by the history of philosophy in all past ages, it ought to 
have taught man, long ago, to treat with contempt hypotheses in every branch of 
philosophy, and to despair of ever advancing real knowledge that way." (Laudan, 0000). 
Laudan has noted seven kinds of arguments that Reid used to bolster his 
anti-hypotheticalism and I shall mention them here (taken directly from 
Laudan, pp. 109-14): 
(1) "As a matter of historical fact, hypotheses and conjectures have not 
been very productive, and have tended to mislead rather than 
enlighten us." 
(2) "The adoption of an hypothesis prejudices the impartiality of the 
scientist." If it is our creation, we take a vested interest in it and are 
liable to test it less severely. Also, if an hypothesis is appealing on a 
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priori grounds, we are prone to decide the truth and falsity of other 
empirical propositions by their accord with that hypothesis rather 
than by testing the hypothesis itself by empirical statements whose 
truth has been determined independently. 
(3) "The hypothetical method presupposes a greater simplicity in nature 
than we find there." We usually select the simplest hypothesis from 
set of hypotheses that explain phenomena, but the simplest is 
usually wide of the mark. 
(4) "The use of hypotheses assumes that man's reason is capable of 
understanding the works of God." God's ingenuity is infinitely 
superior to ours; thus it is highly unlikely that human conjectures 
would discover the causes of God's handiwork. 
(5) "Hypotheses can never be proved by reductio methods." No crucial 
experiment can show that a particular hypothesis uniquely explains 
a phenomenon, usually because we cannot enumerate all possible 
hypotheses. 
(6) "The use of hypotheses usually violates Newton's first 'Regula 
Philosophandi'," which says that no more causes are to be admitted 
than those which are both true and sufficient to explain the 
appearances. 
(7) "The hypothetical method substitutes premature theoretical in-
genuity for painstaking experimental rigour." Reid, like many other 
British inductivists, hoped for a logic of discovery - a set of rules 
that would allow the devising of scientific laws and theories with less 
reliance on the need for ingenuity and imagination. 
Although Reid, writmg in the late 18th century, was probably the first 
and most vigorous philosophical defender of Newton's anti-hypotheticalism, 
British philosophers of logic and scientific method in the 19th century all 
(including Brown, Herschel, Whewell, Mill, Hamilton, De Morgan, and Jevons) 
spent some time discussing Newton's views on scientific method, including 
hypotheses. 
Brown devoted some pages showing that hypotheses are often invented 
to explain why some phenomenon occurs. The consequence often is that the 
hypothesis is just as mysterious as the phenomenon it was to explain, thus, 
leaving two mysteries to be explained where formerly there was one. Brown, 
however, argues that hypotheses are essential to the first stage of scientific 
inquiry (but only the first stage): 
"That hypotheses, in that wide use of the word which implies ever thing conjectural, are 
without use in philosophy it would be absurd to affirm, since every inquiry may, in that 
wide sense, be said to presuppose them, and must always pre-suppose them if the inquiry 
have any objects. They are of use, however, not as superseding investigation, but as 
directing observation to certain objects - not as telling us what we are to believe, but as 
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pointing out to us what we are to endeavor to ascertain. An hypothesis, in this view, of 
it, is nothing more than a reason for making one experiment or observation rather than 
another; and it is evident, that, without some reason of this kind, as experiments and 
observations. are almost infinite, inquiry would be altogether profitless. To make 
experiments at random is not to philosophize: it becomes philosophy, only when the 
experiments are made with a certain view, and to make them with any particular view, is 
to suppose the presence of something, the operation of which they will tend either to 
prove or disprove." (Brown, 1820:80). 
Brown also marks out the difference between a theory and a hypothesis 
a distinction rarely articulared by early methodologists. The difference, he 
says, is this: 
" ... we commonly give the name of hypothesis to cases, in which we suppose the 
intervention of some substance, of the existence of which, as present in the 
phenomenon, we have no direct proof, or of some additional quality of a substance 
before unobserved - and the name of theory to cases, which do not suppose the 
existence of any substance that is not actually observed, or of any quality that has not 
been actually observed, but merely the continuance, in certain new circumstances, of 
tendencies observed in other circumstances." (Brown, 1820:84). 
This distinction is similar to Newton's distinction between hypotheses 
and propositions induced from phenomena. However, Brown goes on to 
mitigate the differences between hypotheses, noting that both are open to 
error (falSification?), though theories are less open to this risk. 
John Herschel (1792-1871) was considered to be the most prominent 
scientist in England when his Preliminary Discourse on Scientific Method was 
published in 1830. This widely read book was quite influential - especially 
on Mill, who borrowed his famous inductive canons from Herschel's methods 
"for the discovery of proximate cause," and also on Whewell, who cherished 
Herschel's friendship above all others. Herschel, it can be said, clearly saw the 
distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification. 
Laws and theories may be arrived at by either of 2 methods or a combination 
of them: 
(1) by an induction schema (laws of agreement, difference, concomitant 
variations, residues), which retained the Newtonian spirit of a 
"deduction from the phenomena." Or 
(2) by "a bold hypothesis": such as the introduction of the luminiferous 
aether by T. Young in the wave theory of light. 
This latter method is clearly contrary to the Newtonian spirit, since such 
hypotheses might refer to non-phenomenal entities. But, and this is the 
important point, as long as such hypotheses about the mode of action or 
mechanism of non-phenomenal entities lead to testable consequences, the 
procedure of arriving at scientific propositions by the method of hypotheses 
is on a par with that of induction. Herschel does not say that the use of 
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hypotheses is essential to the method of science, but clearly held it in esteem. 
(Massi, 1969:1-36; Herschel, 1831: 142-65). 
A nearly complete liberation from Newton's restrictions on hypotheses is 
obtained in the writings of William Whewell (1794-1866). His major work in 
philosophy of science, entitled the Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, is 
the source of most of his views on the nature of hypotheses. 
Whewell clearly thought the formulation and use of hypotheses was 
cssenrial to the method of science: "to form hypotheses, and then to employ 
much labor and skill in refuting, if they do not succeed in establishing them, 
is a part of the usual process of inventive minds. Such a proceeding belongs to 
the rule of genius of discovery, rather than (as has been often taught in 
modern times) to the exception." (Whewell, 1967:56). Further "A facility in 
devising hypotheses, therefore, is so far from being a fault in the intellectual 
character of a discoverer, that it is, in truth, a faculty indispensable to his 
task." (p. 54) Clearly, Whewell had no qualms about gathering hypotheses 
from metaphysics, as this quote shows: "Physical discoverers have differed 
from barren speculators not by having no metaphysics in their heads, but by 
having good metaphysics in their heads while their adversaries had bad ... " 
(Whewell, 1858 :vii). Whewell had no qualms about the use of hypotheses 
referring to non-phenomenal entities such as atoms or the luminiferous 
aether. 
One reason Whewell could be completely relaxed about the admissibility 
of hypotheses into science is because he saw quite clearly what constituted 
the test of a sound hypothesis. Certainly, a good hypothesis must explain the 
class of facts for which it is invented; but an hypothesis achieving what 
Whewell called a "consilence of inductions" achieves near certitude in his 
eyes. 
A consilience occurs in the following circumstances (Laudan, 1971: 371): 
(1) When an hypothesis is capable of explaining two (or more) known 
classes of facts (or laws). 
(2) When an hypothesis can successfully predict cases of a kind different 
from those which were contemplated in the formation of the 
hypothesis. 
(3) When an hypothesis can successfully predict or explain the occur-
rence of phenomena which, on the basis of our background 
knowledge, we would not have expected to occur. 
Few methodologists would disagree with Whewell on any of these points 
today. 
We have briet1y surveyed the relaxing of the Newtonian hard line on 
hypotheses by later British methodologists. We have not attempted to explain 
why this loosening took place in Brown, Herschel and Whewell ~ this would 
be the subject of a different, longer paper. But, as hinted in our discussion of 
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Herschel, the necessity for methodologists to account for the advances in 
non-mechanical sciences such as optics and chemistry, where what we now 
call "models" were successfully employed, seems to be a relevant factoL 
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